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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines three different methodologies for 
producing loss-of-mission (LOM) and loss-of-crew (LOC) 
risks estimates for probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of 
crewed spacecraft. The three bottom-up, component-based 
PRA approaches examined are a traditional static fault tree, a 
fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. 
These approaches were used to model the reaction control 
system thruster pod of a generic crewed spacecraft and 
mission, and a comparative analysis of the methods is 
presented.  
The methodologies are assessed in terms of the process of 
modeling a system, the actionable information produced for 
the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk 
evaluation generated. The system modeling process is 
compared in terms of the effort required to generate the initial 
model, update the model in response to design changes, and 
support mass-versus-risk trade studies. The results are 
compared by examining the top-level LOM/LOC estimates 
and the relative risk driver rankings at the failure mode level. 
The fidelity of each modeling methodology is discussed in 
terms of its capability to handle real-world system dynamics 
such as cold-sparing, changes in mission operations due to 
loss of redundancy, and common cause failure modes.  
The paper also discusses the applicability of each 
methodology to different phases of system development and 
shows that a single methodology may not be suitable for all of 
the many purposes of a spacecraft PRA. The fault tree hybrid 
approach is shown to be best suited to the needs of early 
assessments during conceptual design phases. As the design 
begins to mature, the level of detail represented in the risk 
model must go beyond redundancy and nominal mission 
operations to include dynamic, time- and state-dependent 
system responses as well as diverse system capabilities. This 
is best accomplished using the dynamic simulation approach, 
since these phenomena are not easily captured by static 
methods. Ultimately, once the design has been finalized and 
the goal of the PRA is to provide design validation and 
requirement verification, more traditional, static fault tree 
approaches may become as appropriate as the simulation 
method. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design 
team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while 
iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until 
the system meets mission objects and is achievable within 
constraints [1].  To arrive at a space system design that is 
likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, 
performance and risk, the system requirements must be 
understood and traded against each other as early as the 
conceptual design phase [2]. Depending on the project phase 
and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies 
could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable 
such a process.  
In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, 
and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative 
analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA 
approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a 
traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic 
Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a 
generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and 
mission [3]. The methods are assessed in terms of the process 
of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for 
the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk 
evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the 
applicability of each methodology to the different phases of 
system development. 
2 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The nominal mission under consideration is that of a 
crewed spacecraft visiting the International Space Station 
(ISS). The spacecraft is launched into orbit and then must use 
its onboard propulsion and RCS to rendezvous and dock with 
ISS 24 hours after launch. Once docked, the spacecraft 
remains on orbit for 210 days while the RCS is relatively 
quiescent. Once the spacecraft has completed its stay at ISS, 
or in the event of an abort from orbit, the spacecraft must once 
again use its propulsion and RCS to perform de-orbit, entry, 
descent and landing operations to return the crew safely within 
4 hours.  
The RCS thruster pod considered consists of two groups 
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of three thrusters. Loss of any two thrusters in the same group 
triggers an abort from orbit and ends the nominal mission, thus 
producing a loss of mission (LOM), and the loss of an entire 
group triggers a loss of crew (LOC). A simplified schematic of 
this system is shown in Figure 1, with thrusters represented as 
blue triangles and isolation valves represented as blue boxes. 
The nominal operation of the system calls for a “stand-by” 
thruster-firing protocol, with Thruster A to be fired until it 
experiences a failure, then Thruster B is fired until failure, and 
finally Thruster C would then be used to return the crew. 
Figure 1 – RCS Thruster Pod Configuration 
Each thruster consists of a fuel valve, an oxidizer valve, 
and an exciter. The valves failure modes are failure to open on 
demand, failure to close on demand, operational failure while 
firing, and leakage over time. The exciter can fail off when 
powered on. The failure rate data is summarized in Table 1. 
These failure rates are from tables provided in the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers reliability data book [4]. 
 
Failure Mode Failure Rate / Probability 
Valve – Fails to Open 2.05e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails to Close 1.51e-6 / demand 
Valve – Fails Operationally 9.00e-7 / hour 
Valve – Fails Leaky 5.00e-8 / hour 
Exciter – Fails Off 1.69e-5 / hour 
Table 1 – Failure Rate Data 
Each fuel and oxidizer valve is backed up by an isolation 
valve, which is shared between two thrusters in different 
groups. The isolation valve is nominally open and only closes 
if one of two downstream valves has failed open or leaks. If 
the isolation valve fails to close or leaks, then a LOC is 
assumed to occur immediately. If the isolation valve 
successfully closes, then both downstream thrusters are 
deselected for the rest of the mission and the isolation valve 
must not leak in order to avoid either LOC while crewed or 
loss of vehicle (LOV) while docked to ISS.  
Table 2 summarizes the risk exposure times and demands 
by mission phase for each thruster group in the pod. It is 
important to note that only the currently selected thruster is 
demanded to fire, while all other thrusters only accrue risk of a 
valve leakage failure. This leads to uncertainty about how 
many demands and how much firing time will be accrued by 
each individual thruster in this cold-spare configuration during 
an actual mission. 
 
Failure Mode Pre-Docking Docked Post-Undock 
Valve Fails to Open 2,000 demands N/A 1,000 demands 
Valve Fails to Close 2,000 demands N/A 1,000 demands 
Valve Fails Operationally 2 hrs N/A 1 hr 
Valve Fails Leaky 24 hrs 5,040 hrs 4 hrs 
Exciter Fails Off 24 hrs N/A 4 hrs 
Table 2 – Risk Exposure by Mission Phase 
Table 3 gives the common cause factor (CCF) values that 
were used for the RCS thrusters. These CCFs are based upon 
the Global Alpha Modeling Tool (GAMUT) [5] developed at 
NASA Johnson Space Center, which is based upon 
NUREG/CR-5485 [6]. The values assume that the thrusters 
use demand-type components that undergo a staggered testing 
scheme in which they are periodically inspected for 
indications of incipient failure modes. 
 
Common Cause Group Size Common Cause Factor 
CCF of 2 out of 3 0.04830 
CCF of 3 out of 3 0.00517 
Table 3 – Common Cause Failure Conditional Probabilities 
3 METHODOLOGIES 
Despite the common set of assumptions about concept of 
operation, risk exposure, and failure rates presented here, each 
method must make additional assumptions in order to produce 
a risk estimate. As such, each methodology provides a risk 
estimate for an approximate problem. The degree of the 
approximation versus the cost of obtaining the solution, in 
terms of risk analyst effort and time, is of key interest in 
determining the value provided to the design team.  
3.1  Static Fault Tree Approach 
This approach utilized SAPHIRE 8 [7], developed at the 
Idaho National Laboratory, to construct a static fault tree of 
the RCS thruster system risks. Multiple instances of the fault 
tree were constructed to capture the various LOM and LOC 
end states, since a single model cannot capture both. Having 
multiple models of the same system can prove difficult to 
manage if the design is rapidly evolving, the turnaround time 
for performing trade studies is fast, or the inputs are in flux. 
The basic events of the fault tree were calculated off-line 
and loaded into the model. A major assumption that must be 
made is determining how many demands each thruster must 
undertake successfully. Conservatively, it could be assumed 
that each thruster in a group must fire all 3,000 demands of the 
mission. However, this excessive conservatism produces 
unrealistically high risk estimates that are not useful. For this 
assessment it has been optimistically assumed that all three 
thrusters in a group each fire an equal amount. The true 
dynamic reallocation of numbers of thruster firings, firing 
times, and leakage times cannot easily be accounted for in a 
fault tree. For example, an isolation valve should only begin to 
accrue leakage risk after a random thruster valve failure, but 
because the time of this failure is uncertain, the model must 
conservatively assume that the isolation valve must not leak 
for the entire mission duration.  
Common cause failure modes are only captured when 
they would result directly in a LOM or LOC, depending upon 
the end-state of the model. Thus, the model does not take into 
account mixed cases of both random and common cause 
failure modes combining to cause LOC.  
The fault tree approach also does not allow for an elegant 
method of accounting for time-varying abort criteria. In order 
to capture these time- and state-dependent system 
functionalities and behaviors, an intractable number of event 
trees and corresponding fault trees would need to be 
constructed. This would make the assessment prohibitively 
costly and unable to keep up with a rapidly evolving 
conceptual or preliminary design. However, using this type of 
method with a long development lead-time and conservative 
assumptions may be appropriate later in the critical design 
phase when the design has stabilized and the purpose of the 
assessment is to verify that it meets a risk requirement. 
After the model is created, it must be solved using a 
specific method in the SAPHIRE program. Both the results 
and the computation time can vary widely, depending on the 
chosen solver method and the number of cut-sets it produces. 
The cut-sets capture all of the model’s possible failure modes 
and their calculated probabilities deterministically, yielding an 
incredible amount of data that must be processed in order to 
provide actionable information to decision makers. 
Overall, this method produces a very precise solution, but 
to a very approximate problem. It is extremely useful for 
rigorously capturing all potential failure modes of a static 
approximation of the system, but suffers from a lack of 
responsiveness, which can be a detriment in assessing rapidly 
evolving designs. 
3.2 Rapid Fault Tree Hybrid Approach 
The hybrid approach uses the Ames Reliability Tool 
(ART), an Excel-based, implicit event-tree/fault-tree generator 
developed at NASA Ames Research Center, based upon 
previous work [8]. The ART model deterministically produces 
estimates of LOM and LOC, focusing on risk-driving cut-sets, 
which are expected to be those due to common cause failure 
modes and combinatorial mixed cases of both random failures 
and common cause failures within a specific failure mode or 
component. 
The ART model is able to capture dynamic reallocation of 
demands after a failure by using well-known “cold spare” or 
stand-by unit redundancy calculations [9]. This method also 
accounts for the dynamic change in mission duration if an 
abort is triggered, and accurately reflects the reduction in crew 
risk in the case of a degraded vehicle state. Additionally, only 
one model of the system needs to be built, as the ART is able 
to produce both LOM and LOC estimates with an extremely 
simple set of input fields. This method utilizes the built-in 
functionality of the ART to rapidly create and update models, 
enabling the risk analyst to work in real-time with designers.  
The limitations of this method are that the ART is not 
able to handle all potential redundancy configurations and 
does not take into account cross-cutting failure modes between 
different types of components or different failure modes 
within a set of similar components. As such, this method does 
not account for cascade failure modes where a thruster failing 
open in one group propagates to deselect the corresponding 
thruster in the other group due to activation of the shared 
isolation valve. Furthermore, the ART model does not capture 
thruster loss due to combinations of failure modes, i.e., when 
one thruster fails to open while another thruster fails to close.  
Depending on the system’s risk-driving failure modes, the 
overall risk results may or may not be impacted by 
optimistically omitting these cut-sets since they contain only 
random failures, which are often lower probability than those 
containing common cause failures. Moreover, if the purpose 
of the risk assessment is to compare two competing designs, 
then it is conceivable that these failure modes will not be a 
difference that makes a difference in the design trade study.  
This method sacrifices precision in the absolute risk 
estimate in order to respond more rapidly to the needs of the 
decision makers. It captures the system’s key dynamics to 
provide accurate relative rankings of the risk drivers. It also 
allows the risk analyst to quickly produce a range of estimates 
based upon uncertain input data to determine the sensitivity of 
the estimate to the lack of design knowledge. 
3.3 Dynamic Monte Carlo Simulation Approach 
This approach utilizes commercially available, Monte 
Carlo-style simulation software called GoldSim [10]. The 
approach uses more complex models that seek to include all 
dynamic interactions and dependencies between all 
components and failure modes.  
In addition to LOM and LOC estimates, these models are 
also able to produce estimates of LOV or crew-stranding at 
ISS, scenario-based event timing information, and data on 
successful missions or degraded vehicle states that do not 
trigger LOC, LOV, or LOM. These results can provide 
decision makers with great insight into maintenance concerns 
or the value of repair capability.  
Unlike a traditional fault tree, the dynamic approach is 
able to handle more complex and often more representative 
graph-like connections and dependencies that occur in many 
space systems. The Monte Carlo approach inherently allows 
dynamic reallocation of demands and changes in system 
topology that may occur after failure. Common cause failure 
modes can be gracefully introduced into the model framework, 
which enables complete simulation of the Multiple Greek 
Letter (MGL) [11] method which is a more accurate 
representation of this phenomenon as compared to the other 
approaches.  
Overall, this method most accurately captures the 
system’s behavior and yields the greatest design insights, but 
comes at the cost of greatly increased model complexity. This 
complexity reduces the model’s ability to rapidly respond to 
an evolving design, makes debugging and validation 
extremely challenging, and increases computational run-times 
depending on the number of realizations required to achieve 
the desired level of confidence in the risk estimate. These 
factors can make the approach too costly to effectively support 
risk-informed design in early stages of development. 
However, recent advancements in cloud computing [12] and 
supercomputing [13] are reducing the time required to produce 
risk estimates at the desired confidence level and may enable 
these complex analysis techniques to become advantageous 
earlier in the design cycle. 
4 RESULTS 
LOM and LOC results from the three modeling 
approaches are presented in Figure 2. As expected, the hybrid 
model predicts lower risk than the simulation methodology 
due to its known omission of cross-failure or cross-component 
failure modes. The hybrid model captures the majority of the 
LOM and LOC risks, which stem from CCF modes.  
Figure 2 – System-Level LOM/LOC Results by Model 
The fault tree results were calculated with both the ‘Min-
Cut’ and ‘BDD’ solvers built into the SAPHIRE program, 
which produced numerical results that differed by 2%. The 
fault tree results are lower than those of the other methods due 
to the optimistic assumption about the duty cycle for each 
thruster, which was necessitated by the inability to capture 
dynamic demand reallocation. Such an approach does not take 
into account the additional demands that other thrusters must 
undertake to make-up for those of a failed group member. 
Contrarily, conservatively neglecting to include dynamic abort 
modes in the fault tree resulted in higher LOC risk. 
The dynamic approach results were obtained running 
100,000 Monte Carlo simulations over a period of 11 hours on 
a quad-core Intel i5 processor. Determining the proper number 
of realizations is important to achieving converged results at 
the desired level of confidence. Producing high-fidelity results 
that capture all possible component connectivity and dynamic 
reallocation of RCS demands would require a prohibitive 
number of realizations. However, this degree of fidelity is not 
necessary to capture a converged estimate at the system level.  
All of the methods considered can produce a top-level 
estimate of LOM and LOC. However, both the hybrid and 
fault tree approach must make many assumptions to 
approximate the real-world system. As a result, when 
compared to the dynamic approach, the hybrid approach 
underestimates LOM and LOC by 33% and 26%, respectively, 
and the fault tree underestimates LOM and LOC by 35% and 
60%, respectively. Depending on the degree of dynamics and 
graph-like component interactions, such assumptions could 
introduce so much uncertainty into the results that they would 
provide minimal actionable information. If the omissions in 
modeling fidelity drive the system risk, then the results cannot 
be trusted on an absolute scale and relative risk results 
between competing design options cannot be utilized. 
A major benefit of the simulation method is that it also 
records the time at which failure occurs. Such information can 
be extremely useful if the consequences of failure are time- 
and state-dependent, such as during an ascent to orbit on a 
failing launch vehicle [14] or if increased time on orbit would 
enable additional scientific research and increased availability 
of the ISS. In particular, accounting for failure timing allows 
failures that occur while docked to ISS to be counted as LOV 
instead of LOC. The dynamic results can provide insight into 
degraded system states that do not lead to a LOM, but simply 
to a loss of redundancy and continuation of the nominal 
mission. This, in turn, can inform expected component failure 
frequencies to aid in determining repair capabilities and 
maintenance schedules. 
Point estimates of system-level risk can be useful for 
comparing two different design options or determining if a 
design meets requirements. However, during the conceptual 
and preliminary phases of system development, insights into 
the system’s current risk drivers can provide designers with 
valuable guidance and feedback on how to most effectively 
increase system reliability and safety. The LOM risk drivers at 
the thruster failure mode level are provided in Figure 3 for the 
hybrid and dynamic methods and in Figure 4 for the fault tree 
method. The fault tree model results for these cases do not 
immediately yield actionable information to design teams, as 
the LOM and LOC fault trees respectively produced 900 and 
3,956 cut-sets of exact system failure modes, precisely 
capturing data about which components failed in what mode. 
For LOM, there are only 24 unique classes of cut-sets when 
the specificity of which exact component failed is removed. 
However, it is still difficult to directly apply the results in 
Figure 4 to provide actionable information to the design team. 
Similarly, the results from the dynamic simulation method 
must also be processed. Figure 3 shows the frequency of 
failure of each component during a mission with a LOM 
outcome. Both the frequency of failure and frequency of 
failure leading to a LOM provide actionable information about 
what failure modes are driving the system risk. However, a 
drawback of the dynamic method is that the true frequencies 
of failure modes not observed during any of the simulation 
realizations remain somewhat uncertain. In this case, there 
were no observed failures of the isolation valves, even though 
this failure mode does show up in both the hybrid and fault 
tree results. This is due to the conservative assumption, which 
both the fault tree and hybrid models make, that the diverse 
leak protection provided by the isolation valves must be 
reliable for the entire mission, since the models are not able to 
capture this dynamic behavior explicitly. 
Figure 3 – LOM results for the Hybrid and Dynamic methods 
Figure 4 – LOM results for the Fault Tree method 
The hybrid model immediately provides an ordered list of 
approximate risk drivers at the failure mode level, but since 
the approach neglects to model cross-component interactions, 
it omits an absolute portion of the risk. Since these cross-
component cut-sets do not drive the system risk, however, the 
primary relative risk drivers remain the same.   
Providing risk data at the failure-mode level can yield 
much richer insights into how system safety and reliability can 
be improved most efficiently. In this case, it is clear that the 
dominant failure modes are valves failing to open or valves 
failing to close. The fault tree results do provide the 
additional, beneficial information that it is common cause 
failures of these failure modes that drive system risk. Thus, a 
designer would want to spend precious project resources, such 
as mass, to protect against these failure modes by backing up 
these functions redundantly or reducing the susceptibility of 
these components to common cause failures.  
5 DISCUSSION 
The applicability of each methodology to the different 
phases of system development can now be discussed in light 
of the benefits and drawbacks presented here.  
The methodology selected during the conceptual design 
phase needs to respond rapidly to a changing design and 
provide accurate relative risk drivers with limited design 
detail. The methodology best suited to providing such insights 
is the rapid fault tree hybrid approach. Interestingly, many of 
the limitations associated with the hybrid approach are 
minimized early in the system development life cycle because 
the precise design details about cross-strapping and 
component connectivity are still yet to be determined. 
Moreover, the purpose of PRA during the conceptual design 
phase is to guide initial design decisions. Thus, most PRA in 
this phase will be of a relative nature and a precise, absolute 
risk estimate is not as important as the comparative differences 
between multiple, competing design options. Furthermore, at 
this phase of development, the PRA is often more concerned 
with reliability potential rather than “as-drawn” reliability. 
As the design begins to mature, more precise insights are 
required to accurately discriminate between similar trade study 
options and identify the factors that can most efficiently 
reduce overall risk. Additionally, providing accurate absolute 
risk estimates becomes increasingly important to enable 
comparison of design options in completely unrelated 
subsystems. Design trade studies will also start to become 
more subtly nuanced and require precise representations of 
real-world system operation. To accomplish this, the level of 
design detail represented in the risk model must go beyond 
redundancy and nominal mission operations to include 
dynamic, time- and state-dependent system responses as well 
as diverse system capabilities. The dynamic methodology is 
best suited to this phase of development, as many risk-driving 
and risk-differentiating phenomena are not easily captured by 
static methods.  
Ultimately, once the design has been finalized, more 
traditional, static fault tree approaches may become as 
appropriate as the simulation method. At this point in the 
design cycle, the goal of the PRA is often to show that the 
system meets requirements or to validate the design by 
exhaustively searching for unintended failure modes or cut-
sets that are not intuitively obvious but are easily revealed 
through a fault tree. In this case, making overly conservative 
assumptions can be completely valid. Moreover, since the 
questions being asked of the PRA are much broader and less 
specific, the PRA does not have to provide decision makers 
with as much detailed insight in such a rapid fashion.  
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